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First, the state of domestic trade policy is described, with particular emphasis on the structure and 
economic effects of border policies.  Then, CAR‟s regional integration efforts are examined, 
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TRADE POLICY AND REGIONALISM IN THE  
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC 

 
 
1. BACKGROUND 
Over the past decade, countries in Sub-Saharan Africa have, in general, made significant 
progress in opening up their economies to international markets by reducing duties on imports.  
Between 1996 and 2005, the average tariff in the 47 countries south of the Sahara fell from 22 per 
cent to 15 per cent.  This trend towards greater liberalization of domestic markets was observable 
throughout West, East, and Southern Africa, but not in Central Africa.  Indeed, the tariff average 
in member states of the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC) 
remained flat for most of the past decade and even increased slightly in recent years (Figure 1).  
Central Africa thereby turned from a relatively low protection region by African standards to a 
high protection region.  Tariff protection in CAR, which is a member of CEMAC, closely follows 
the trend in other Central African countries. 
Figure 1:  Tariff averages in sub-Saharan Africa 
(in per cent) 
Note:  Averages based on simple mean of applied tariffs (i.e. most favored nation (MFN) duties plus 
customs surcharges).  Regional averages are calculated based on membership in the respective regional 
trade agreements as of July 2006.  The membership in the Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa 
(COMESA) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) overlaps. 
Source: World Bank staff. 
 
                                                 

 This background paper for the CAR-Diagnostic Trade Integration Study was prepared in August 2006 by 
Peter Walkenhorst, Senior Economist, International Trade Department, World Bank, Washington DC. 
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The following discussion reviews the trade policy situation in CAR and identifies a 
number of key issues and challenges for the country.  The focus of the study is thereby on how 
trade taxes and quantitative restrictions affect the goods sector.  The analysis falls into three parts.  
First, the state of domestic trade policy is described, with particular emphasis on the structure and 
economic effects of border policies.  Then, CAR‟s regional integration efforts are examined, 
including a preliminary assessment of the impacts of the formation of the CEMAC customs 
union.  And finally, some priorities for the attention of policy makers and international donors are 
identified based on the preceding analysis. 
2. DOMESTIC TRADE POLICIES 
2.1 Border Policies 
CAR is a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) since May 1995 and its trade 
policy is guided by adherence to WTO rights and obligations.  CAR applies the common external 
tariff of the Community of Central African Countries (CEMAC) and grants at least most-favored-
nation (MFN) treatment to its trading partners.  CAR has tariff bindings at rates ranging from 
20 per cent to 70 per cent on goods in 3 529 tariff lines (at the Harmonized System (HS) 8-digit 
level), i.e. in 62.5 per cent of all tariff lines.  The average bound tariff amounts to 36 per cent.  
Tariff bindings represent the maximum allowable tariffs that WTO members have scheduled as 
part of their commitments in multilateral trade negotiations.  Application of import duties above 
bound rates is not allowed, unless trading partners adversely affected by the tariff change are 
compensated. 
Yet, countries are free to apply import duties that are lower than their bindings, which is 
the case in CAR.  The country‟s simple MFN-tariff average across all tariff lines (at the HS 10-
digit level) was 19.1 per cent in 2005, and the import-weighted average amounted to 17.1 per cent 
(Table 1).  The applied tariff structure employs five duty bands, ranging from zero to 30 per cent.  
Medical equipment and supplies and educational materials can enter the country free of import 
duty, while tariffs of 5, 10, 20, and 30 per cent, respectively, are charged on essential goods, raw 
materials and capital goods, intermediate goods, and consumer goods.  Of the 6 172 tariff lines, 
6 095 (or 99 per cent) are non-zero, with 2 471 (40 per cent) being subject to the highest duty rate 
of 30 per cent.   
In addition to the MFN-tariffs, CAR applies a 10 per cent anti-pollution tax on imports of 
used cars, and a variable levy on petroleum imports.  The amount of the latter is linked to the 
difference between the regulated domestic petroleum price and the import price.  As the domestic 
petroleum price has not been changed since 2000, the increase in world petroleum prices since 
then has meant that the petroleum levy has been declining over time.  Indeed, at petroleum prices 
of more than USD 70, the petrol tax has become negative, i.e. turned into an import subsidy. 
Imports from other members of CEMAC enter CAR in principle under preferential 
conditions.  In particular, CAR practices regional free trade, so that imports from CEMAC 
countries can enter the Central African market without paying duty.  However, since May 2004 
the country applies a derogation to the Community‟s free trade arrangement that allows it to treat 
imports of selected products from CEMAC partners as originating outside the Community and 
levy a Community Preference Duty (“Taxe de Préférence Communautaire”), which is equal to the 
MFN duty, on them.  The products concerned include prepared foods, wine, whisky, and 
cosmetics.  The derogation was originally designed to temporarily protect CAR against import 
surges over a period of six months, but has subsequently been renewed several times. 
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Table 1:  Characteristics of the import regime in the Central African Republic, 2005 
 Structure of MFN tariffs Avg. MFN (%) Import value 
Product classification 
(SITC-3) 
 
Number 
of tariff 
lines 
Min. 
tariff 
(%) 
Max. 
tariff 
(%) 
Simple 
tariff 
avg 
Import 
w‟ted 
avg. 
Million 
FCFA 
 
Per 
cent 
 
Food & live animals 731 0 30 24.7 26.3 12 504 19.6 
Beverages & tobacco 46 10 30 27.4 17.1 2 254 3.5 
Crude materials, except food & fuel 740 0 30 20.9 25.4 2 240 3.5 
Mineral fuel & lubricants 58 10 20 10.2 10.0 13 642 21.4 
Animal & veg oils, fats & wax 48 10 30 24.8 30.0 1 064 1.7 
Chemicals & related products 909 0 30 11.0 7.0 6 736 10.6 
Manufactured goods 1 720 0 30 20.2 19.1 9 353 14.7 
Machinery & transport equipment 1 058 0 30 14.4 16.4 12 364 19.4 
Miscellaneous manufatured articles 850 0 30 24.8 19.4 3 539 5.6 
Other commodities 12 0 30 15.0 -  0 0.0 
Total 6 172 0 30 19.1 17.1 63 697 100.0 
Note:  All reported information is derived from data at the tariff line (HS 10-digit) level.  Information on 
import value based on transactions processed through ASYCUDA, so that trade through non-computerized 
border stations, which is estimated at about 10 per cent of the total, is not covered. 
Source: World Bank staff based on information from National Authorities. 
 
Imports are also subject to several earmarked duties.  In particular, CAR charges the 
CEMAC Community Levy (“Taxe Communautaire d‟Intégration”) of 1 per cent and the CEEAC 
Community Levy (“Contribution Communautaire d‟Intégration”) of 0.4 per cent on imports from 
countries outside CEMAC and CEEAC.  Moreover, imports are subject to a 0.5 per cent 
information technology surcharge (“Redevance pour l'Equipement Informatique des Finances”), a 
0.25 per cent road use charge (“Redevance d‟Usage Routier“), and a 0.05 per cent surcharge to 
finance the operations of OHADA (“L'Organisation pour l'Harmonisation en Afrique du Droit des 
Affaires”). 
In addition, several non-trade specific taxes are collected at the border.  In particular, 
importers have to pay a Presumptive Income Tax (“Impôt Minimum Forfaitaire”) of 1 per cent 
for enterprises and 3 per cent for individuals.  Moreover, excise taxes of 25 per cent apply to 
selected products, notably alcoholic beverages and tobacco, in 121 tariff lines.  Imports are also 
subject to value-added tax (VAT), which was increased from 18 per cent to 19 per cent in January 
2006 and applies to the customs value plus tariffs and excise duties.  There are exemptions from 
VAT for essential products, which CAR implements in accordance with a corresponding 
CEMAC list of products in 224 tariff lines.   
In sum, the total tax burden on imports can be very heavy and almost double the price of 
imported goods.  In the extreme, a 30 per cent tariff plus 25 per cent excise tax multiplied by a 
VAT of 19 per cent to which earmarked duties of 2.2 per cent and a Presumptive Income Tax of 
up to 3 per cent are added brings the total tax levied on imports to 90 per cent.  Such high levels 
of taxation provide a strong incentive for importers to search for possibilities of tax avoidance, 
including through undervaluation of merchandise and other illicit means. 
Exemptions from import duties and other border taxes reduce the average burden on 
importers.  Comparing government revenues from import duties with the value of imports makes 
it possible to determine the ex-post average tariff rate, which takes into account the reduced duties 
on imports under preferential agreements, duty exemptions, and “leakage” due to weak customs 
control.  If the average of the import duty revenues for 2005 is related to the value of imports 
during that year, the ex-post average tariff rate comes to 8.9 per cent.  Hence, the effectively paid 
 5 
tariff is only half as high as the trade-weighted average of listed rates.  The corresponding 
average total ex-post burden of trade taxes on imports, including value-added, excise taxes, petrol 
taxes and customs surcharges, amounted to 26.9 per cent. 
Import duties raise revenue to finance the functioning of the public sector, but the 
Government views import taxes also as a means of protecting domestic industry from foreign 
competition.  CAR‟s tariff regime is generally escalatory, so that tariffs on finished goods are 
higher than tariffs on semi-processed products, which in turn are higher than tariffs on raw 
materials (Figure 2).  While tariff escalation is a feature of trade policy in many countries, 
officials should be aware of the economic consequences and risks that such tariff structures bear 
for international competitiveness.   
In particular, CAR‟s tobacco industry, which is a major industrial activity and accounts 
for almost 30 per cent of the country‟s total manufacturing value-added, turns out to be the sector 
with the highest degree of tariff escalation.  Average tariffs on finished products are nearly 
2.7 times as high as import duties on raw materials.  This tariff protection gives rise to very high 
rates of effective protection and introduces a strong anti-export bias.  Tobacco produced for the 
export market does not receive the same market price support that tobacco products for the 
domestic market enjoy, thus biasing producers‟ decisions against selling abroad.  But companies 
that shy away from foreign markets tend to become less competitive over time and less capable of 
exploiting opportunities that might present themselves abroad.  Hence, the very high effective 
protection granted to tobacco producers in CAR does not only hurt tobacco consumers by pushing 
up domestic prices, but also undermines the longer-term viability of tobacco manufacturing as a 
potential export sector. 
Another sector that deserves the Government‟s attention is sugar production.  Since 
November 2003, CAR has been operating an import quota regime for sugar.  The quantitative 
restrictions have been put into place by invoking WTO safeguard provisions and are scheduled to 
remain in force until 2008.  The policy is intended to facilitate the restructuring and 
modernization of the domestic sugar cane processing facility (Société de Gestion Sucrière en 
République Centrafricaine, SOGESCA) under its new, private owner (Sucrière en Afrique, 
SUCAF-RCA).  The Government currently prohibits the establishment of a second sugar 
producer in the country, buys the annual output of the domestic cane processor of about 
8 000 tons at regulated prices, and grants import licenses for about 15 000 tons of sugar to meet 
domestic demand.  Under a memorandum of understanding, 90 per cent of the import licenses are 
allocated to SUCAF, so that this firm holds a near monopoly in the sugar market.  It is reported 
that the company makes a bigger profit from resales of imported sugar than from its core cane 
processing activity.  Domestic retail prices of about FCFA 750 per kilogram were nearly four 
times unit import prices (about FCFA 190 per kilogram) in 2005, which, even after application of 
import duties and value-added taxes, leaves a generous marketing margin.  At the same time, the 
hoped-for technological upgrading and modernization of the domestic cane processing facility 
has been slow and domestic sugar production has not approached the envisaged level of 
15 000 tons per year.  In this context, the Government should review the effectiveness of its sugar 
policy with a view to abolish the quantitative import restrictions and liberalize imports. 
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Figure 2:  Import duties by processing stage 
(in per cent) 
Note:  Average of MFN duties at the tariff line (HS 10-digit) level.  
Source: World Bank staff based on information from National Authorities. 
 
Concerning exports, CAR applies export taxes (“droits de sorties”) to diamonds (4 per 
cent), gold (1 per cent), and timber (10.5 per cent on wood in the rough, 4.05 per cent on sawn 
wood).  There used to be similar taxes on exports of coffee (8.15 per cent) and cotton (6.08 per 
cent), but these charges have been suspended since 1999 in order to alleviate the fiscal burden on 
the already struggling coffee and cotton producers.  In addition to the export taxes, diamonds and 
gold exports are subject to a mining promotion charge (“taxe de promotion minière”), 
respectively, of 1 per cent and 0.75 per cent, and diamond and timber exporters have to pay an 
information technology surcharge of 0.5 per cent.  Moreover, diamond exporters are liable to a 
0.5 per cent charge for Kimberley process certification.  Diamond, gold, and timber exporters also 
have to pay the Presumptive Income Tax at rates of, respectively, 3 per cent, 1 per cent, and 2 per 
cent. 
2.2 Revenues from Trade Taxes 
CAR continues to rely heavily on trade taxes to finance the government budget.  In 2006, 
55 per cent of all tax revenues are expected to relate to cross-border transactions (Figure 3).  
Trade-specific taxes, such as export taxes, import duties, petrol taxes, and customs charges, 
thereby account for two-thirds of trade tax revenue, while the remaining third is derived from 
general taxes collected at the border, such as VAT and excises. 
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Figure 3:  Budgeted composition of Government revenues, 2006 
 
Source:  République Centrafricaine, Loi de Finance, 2006. 
 
The overwhelming share of trade taxes is collected on imports.  In 2005, about 55 per 
cent of all incoming shipments entered CAR under the general customs regime, but these imports 
accounted for 83 per cent of all import tax revenues.  In contrast, special trade regimes that 
offered exemptions under regional trade agreements, conventions and bilateral treaties, or other 
special arrangements provided merely 17 per cent of revenues, although they accounted for 
45 per cent of imports (Figure 4).  Hence, the existing exemptions led to a considerable loss of 
fiscal revenue.  Indeed, if all imports under special regimes would have generated the same fiscal 
yield as the average of imports under the general customs regime (i.e. 40.5 per cent), import tax 
receipts would have been 50 per cent higher.  Alternatively, without exemptions, the same 
revenue could have been raised with border taxes that are a third lower than those actually in 
effect. 
These static calculations of lost revenue due to exemptions do not take the incentive 
effects of border taxes on trade flows into account.  Any attempt to raise revenue through higher 
taxation of imports will tend to reduce import levels by discouraging shipments or diverting trade 
towards informal channels.  CAR‟s heavy reliance on trade taxes for public finance purposes 
currently already provides little scope for trade policy to foster international integration and act as 
an engine of structural change and economic growth.  In this context, the Government should 
resist temptations to continue raising taxes on trade, and instead look for opportunities to reduce 
the burden that is placed on importers and exporters. 
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Figure 4:  Imports and fiscal revenues by customs regime, 2005 
  
Note:  Information based on transactions processed through ASYCUDA, so that trade through non-
computerized border stations, which is estimated at about 10 per cent of the total, is not covered. 
Source:  World Bank staff based on information from National Authorities. 
 
3. REGIONAL INTEGRATION 
Like other countries in Central Africa, CAR is committed to the process of regional 
integration and is pursuing closer ties with neighboring nations.  CAR is currently engaged in two 
regional trade agreements, namely the Community of Central African Countries (CEMAC) and, 
the Economic Community of Central African States (CEEAC).  Moreover, CAR is a member of 
the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) and is party to several bilateral agreements, 
which are mainly focused on forms of regional integration other than trade. 
Additional impetus for regional integration comes from the Economic Partnership 
Agreement (EPA) negotiations with the European Union.  The Cotonou Agreement signed in 
2000 by the EU and 77 African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) States calls for the establishment 
of economic partnerships between the EU and regional groupings of ACP members based on 
reciprocal market access preferences.  In order to facilitate the negotiation process and to enhance 
the development impact of the agreements through increased intra-regional trade, the EU intends 
the EPAs to be signed with free trade areas or customs unions rather than individual countries.  In 
October 2003, the negotiations were officially launched between the European Union and the 
Central African country group, which consists of the members of CEMAC plus Sao Tomé and 
Principe and (since January 2006) the Democratic Republic of Congo.  
3.1 Importance of Trade within the Region 
According to official statistics, the value of trade (imports plus exports) with other 
countries in Sub-saharan Africa amounted to about 14 per cent of CAR‟s total trade during the 
period from 2003 to 2005.  This share is remarkably small for a landlocked country.  The latter 
face additional trade transaction costs related to transit and border clearance when they try to 
reach maritime ports for inter-continental shipment, so that trade with neighboring countries is 
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relatively more advantageous.  Yet, CAR‟s intra-continental trade share falls far short of the 
average of landlocked countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, and is, indeed, lower than the average of 
all countries on the continent (Figure 5). 
Figure 5:  Share of trade with sub-Saharan countries in total trade 
(three year average, 2003-05) 
  
Note:  Only those imports and exports are considered for which the partner country is identified. 
Source:  World Bank staff based on IMF Direction of Trade database. 
 
Two-thirds of CAR‟s African trade are with the country‟s CEMAC partners, notably 
Cameroon and Chad (Table 2).  CAR thereby imports much more from CEMAC countries than it 
exports to them.  Of the non-CEMAC members of CEEAC, only DR Congo is of significant 
importance as a trading partner, and, contrary to its trade relationship within CEMAC, CAR runs 
a merchandise trade surplus with this neighbor.  No trade was reported during 2003-05 with the 
CEEAC-members Angola, Burundi, Rwanda, and Sao Tomé and Principe.   
On a sectoral basis, CAR ran trade deficits with its CEMAC partners in almost all 
product groups in 2005 (Table 3).  The largest net-imports occurred for food and beverages, 
tobacco, and non-metallic minerals (such as cement).  The only products where regional exports 
from CAR exceeded regional imports were timber and timber-related products.  However, official 
figures on regional trade should be interpreted with care, as they are based on information from 
the main computerized border stations only.  Customs posts in the provinces, which presumably 
process a proportionally larger share of trade with regional neighbors, are not covered in official 
statistics. 
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Table 2:  Geographical structure of CAR’s merchandise trade within the region 
(per cent of total trade) 
 Imports Exports Total trade 
 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005 
Cameroon 13.8 13.0 13.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.3 6.9 7.8 
Chad 3.2 3.0 3.1 0.3 0.3 0.4 1.6 1.7 2.0 
Congo, Republic 1.0 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.1 0.2 
Equatorial Guinea 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Gabon 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
CEMAC 18.0 16.2 17.0 0.4 0.5 0.6 8.5 8.8 10.0 
Angola 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Burundi 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 2.3 2.1 2.2 3.0 3.7 4.6 2.6 2.9 3.3 
Rwanda 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Sao Tomé and Principe 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
CEEAC 20.3 18.3 19.2 3.4 4.2 5.2 11.1 11.7 13.3 
Other Sub-saharan Africa 4.0 3.0 2.9 1.0 0.3 0.4 2.4 1.7 1.8 
Total Sub-saharan Africa 24.3 21.3 22.1 4.4 4.4 5.6 13.6 13.4 15.1 
Note: Only those imports and exports are considered for which the partner country is identified. 
Source:  IMF Direction of Trade database. 
 
Moreover, regional trade might be substantially underestimated due to informal cross-
border links.  These transactions are naturally most important with the countries with which CAR 
shares borders, i.e. Cameroon, Chad, Sudan, and DR Congo.  Some strong traditional trade routes 
exist with these countries, and the natural conditions permit transactions outside official channels.  
While by its nature no exact valuation of unofficial cross-border flows is available, the general 
consensus is that informal activities account for a significant share of total trade within the region.   
Over the past years, informality might have lost somewhat in importance, though, as the 
harmonization of trade policies and regulations between CAR and its neighbors and the phasing 
out of intra-regional trade barriers within CEMAC has lowered formal trade transactions costs 
and reduced the incentives to use unofficial channels.  Also, the adoption and implementation of a 
common external tariff has eliminated the gains that could earlier be obtained from world market 
imports into low protection countries and subsequent informal transshipment into high protection 
countries. 
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Table 3:  Sectoral structure of CAR’s merchandise trade with CEMAC partners, 2005 
(Francs CFA) 
ISIC-3 
Code 
Sector 
Imports 
(incl. re-imports) 
Exports 
(incl. re-exports) 
Net-Exports 
01 Agriculture  202 537 950  - 202 537 950 
02 Forestry  1 095 059 287 1 095 059 287 
05 Fishing   4 000 000  4 000 000 
14 Other mining   166 759 500  - 166 759 500 
15 Food & beverages 1 831 264 200  13 641 900 -1 817 622 300 
16 Tobacco 1 381 661 000  -1 381 661 000 
17 Textiles  293 874 000  - 293 874 000 
19 Leather  2 372 500  - 2 372 500 
20 Wood products, except furniture  2 980 000  49 987 521  47 007 521 
21 Paper products  103 315 400  - 103 315 400 
22 Publishing &printing  56 519 550  - 56 519 550 
23 Coke & refined petroleum  180 685 100  15 008 900 - 165 676 200 
24 Chemical products  538 605 040  7 149 000 - 531 456 040 
25 Rubber & plastics  271 207 285  6 000 000 - 265 207 285 
26 Non-metallic minerals 1 759 041 800  -1 759 041 800 
27 Basic metals  704 852 680  - 704 852 680 
28 Fabricated metals  219 376 937  66 225 000 - 153 151 937 
29 Machinery & equipment  8 250 000  3 700 100 - 4 549 900 
30 Office & computing machinery   650 000  -  650 000 
31 Electrical machinery  4 703 300  1 000 000 - 3 703 300 
33 Medical & optical instruments   452 900  -  452 900 
34 Motor vehicles & trailers  414 713 300  - 414 713 300 
35 Other transport equipment  2 270 487  - 2 270 487 
36 Furniture  184 309 800   500 000 - 183 809 800 
99 Goods not elsewhere specified   1 038 200  1 038 200 
 Total trade 8 330 402 729 1 263 309 908 -7 067 092 821 
Note:  Information based on transactions processed through ASYCUDA, so that trade through non-
computerized border stations is not covered. 
Source:  World Bank staff based on information from National Authorities. 
 
2.2 Status of Regional Integration Initiatives 
Central Africa has a long history of regional integration.  CAR, Chad, Congo, and Gabon 
first formed the Equatorial Customs Union (UDE, Union Douanière Equatoriale) in 1959, to 
which Cameroon acceded in 1961.  Subsequently, the five countries further intensified economic 
cooperation in the region, when forming the Customs and Economic Union of Central Africa 
(UDEAC, Union Douanière et Économique de l‟Afrique Centrale) in 1964 and inviting 
Equatorial Guinea to join the Union in 1983.  After the region had endured several economic 
crisis during the 1980s and early 1990s, renewed impetus for regional integration was sought by 
signing the Treaty that devised CEMAC as a successor organization of UDEAC in 1994.  
Member countries ratified the Treaty in 1999 and thereby formally established CEMAC. 
The signing of the CEMAC Treaty coincided with a large-scale devaluation of the Francs 
CFA and the adoption of a common external tariff that all members apply to third country 
imports.  Intra-CEMAC trade was initially subject to a generalized preferential tariff of one-fifth 
of the CET-rate, but these duties were phased out in 1998.  Also, all quantitative restrictions on 
external and intra-regional trade were converted into tariffs of up to 30 per cent during a 
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transition period, and then eliminated in 2000.  In addition to harmonizing tariffs, CEMAC has 
also established common guidelines on customs valuation, excise taxes, and value-added taxes. 
CAR is also a founding member of CEEAC, which was established in 1983 as a wider 
economic community of Central African states.  CEEAC brought together the members of 
UDEAC, the members of the Economic Community of the Great Lakes States (Burundi, Rwanda, 
and Zaïre/DR Congo), as well as Sao Tomé and Principe.  Angola joined the Community in 1999.   
One recent objectives of this regional arrangement has been to foster trade integration through 
preferential tariff treatment of goods originating in member countries.  A free trade initiative was 
supposed to be launched in July 2004 and all intra-regional trade barriers are scheduled to be 
eliminated by January 2008.  However, implementation of the free trade arrangements has been 
lagging behind the original schedule. 
Both CEMAC and CEEAC are multi-faceted arrangements that try to advance integration 
in several domains.  Yet, with respect to the aim of fostering more intensive trade flows, regional 
integration in Central Africa has had only very modest success so far.  Indeed, in relative terms 
intra-CEMAC imports and exports have declined markedly over the past decade and account now 
for less than two per cent of total imports and exports, or just over one per cent of member 
countries‟ GDP (Figure 6).  For most CEMAC members intra-regional trade is only of marginal 
importance.  The exceptions are imports of the two landlocked countries, CAR and Chad, which 
account for more than 10 per cent of the countries‟ respective purchases abroad. 
Figure 6:  Share of intra-CEMAC trade in total trade of CEMAC members 
(per cent) 
  
Source:  World Bank staff based on IMF Direction of Trade database. 
 
The declining relative importance of intra-regional trade in itself does not imply that 
CEMAC has failed in its aims, as the reduction in trade between members over time might have 
been even more pronounced without the arrangement.  Instead, careful economic analysis is 
needed to disentangle the different effects of regional integration and evaluate their overall 
impact (Box 1).  One econometric study used a gravity model and data over the period from 1948 
to 2000 to assess different regional trade agreements (RTAs), including CEMAC.  The analysis 
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found that the trade impacts of CEMAC have been more modest than those of most other RTAs 
(Figure 7).  Moreover, compared with a “normal” level of trade intensity that would be expected 
according to the countries‟ economic size and geographical proximity, the analysis estimates that 
CEMAC has had a very small, but positive impact on intra-regional trade flows.  On the other 
hand, extra-regional imports and exports are below expectations, suggesting that CEMAC with its 
high common external tariff might have given rise to harmful trade diversion rather than 
beneficial trade creation. 
 
Box 1:  Welfare impacts of regional integration initiatives 
The overall welfare consequence of regional integration depend on several factors.  If the reduction of 
intra-regional trade barriers fosters partner countries to expand output and exports of products for which 
they are internationally competitive, the price of final goods or production inputs on the importing country 
market falls to the benefit of consumers and input-purchasing producers.  In this case, welfare-enhancing 
trade is created. 
Moreover, regional trade initiatives can have beneficial indirect effects.  Opening domestic markets to 
partner countries, for example, can increase competition in sectors with previously highly concentrated 
industrial structures and thereby reduce the monopolistic pricing power of incumbents.  Such pro-
competitive impacts are particularly important for countries like CAR that have only a nascent domestic 
competition policy.  Also, regional cooperation can be effective in harmonizing customs procedures and 
domestic regulations in services industries.  Adopting common rules on investment, for example, has the 
potential to encourage increased inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI) by enhancing the credibility of 
FDI-policies and providing a restraint on sudden policy reversals.   
Some observers justify RTAs in political economy terms by seeing them as laboratories for international 
integration, training grounds for negotiations at a broader level, and strategic means of trade policy making.  
By teaming up with regional partners, countries may be able to increase the weight of their positions in 
international trade negotiations and possibly achieve more favorable negotiation outcomes.  Also, regional 
trade agreements make it possible for countries to gain some control over the trade policy of their partner 
countries. 
Conversely, engaging in RTAs implies passing parts of a country‟s sovereignty on to the regional bloc.  For 
example, as a result of joining the EAC customs union, CAR can no longer freely decide on its level of 
import duties, but depends on consensus with the other CEMAC members to pursue changes to the 
common external tariff.  Hence, the institutional framework for trade policy making changes. 
Furthermore, RTAs may result in losses of government revenues, as tariffs on intra-regional trade are 
phased out, or promote costly trade diversion rather than welfare-enhancing trade creation, if trade is 
shifted from efficient producers outside the RTA to preferential trading partners that produce at higher 
costs.  In this case, the government loses tariff revenue on imports from third countries, without domestic 
producers benefiting to a corresponding extent from lower import prices.  The risk for trade diversion to 
occur is particularly high if MFN tariffs remain high and trade with partner countries accounts for only a 
small share of overall trade (World Bank, 2004). A recent review of studies on the trade and welfare effects 
of customs unions concluded that the elimination of intra-regional trade barriers between small developing 
countries is likely to generate mostly trade diversion and little trade creation, unless significant reductions 
in MFN-tariffs accompany the regional integration efforts (Schiff and Winters, 2003).   
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Figure 7:  Estimated deviation of trade flows from expected levels in different RTAs 
(in exponential units) 
  
Source:  World Bank (2005). 
 
One issue that could jeopardize the success or regional integration in Central Africa is the 
overlapping membership of countries in different RTAs.  All members of CEMAC are also 
members of CEEAC.  Moreover, some countries that belong to CEEAC are also members of the 
Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa (Angola, Burundi, DR Congo, Rwanda) or the 
Southern African Development Community (Angola and DR Congo).  Some observers have 
argued that countries could maximize the benefits from regional integration by participating in 
several arrangements simultaneously (Lyakurwa at al., 1997).  Liberalizing trade within smaller 
groups facilitates the coordination and harmonization of national policies, and makes it possible 
to increase competition for sensitive domestic industries at a more measured pace.  Multiple 
agreements also open up alternative liberalization tracks that provide countries with flexibility to 
switch their integration focus in the event that progress within a particular grouping were to stall.  
Moreover, since aid agencies frequently provide funds for region-wide projects, participation in 
multiple regional arrangements might be seen as a means to fully exploit the potential pool of 
donor-funds. 
On the other hand, there are significant drawbacks.  Since each of the agreements 
involves different partners, different rules of origin, different tariff schedules, and different 
implementation periods, effectively administrating the multiple regional integration efforts can 
pose major political and technical challenges and increase trade transactions costs.  These 
consequences from overlapping agreements are bound to intensify as many of the existing 
arrangements, such as CEEAC, are scheduled to deepen their integration by moving from 
preferential agreements to free trade areas or customs unions. 
Multiple membership of overlapping RTAs creates demanding requirements in several 
respects.  In the private sector, traders have to operate within different trade regimes, each with its 
own tariff rates, regulations and procedures.  For example, non-coordination amongst regional 
arrangements concerning transit bonds has been cited by private sector representatives as a 
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significant impediment.  In the border services, customs officials have to deal with different rules 
of origin, trade documentation, and statistical nomenclatures, thereby multiplying internal 
procedures and paperwork.  And on the political level, negotiating and serving different regional 
initiatives can absorb large amounts of scarce administrative resources and occupy policymakers‟ 
attention to a considerable extent.  This concerns, in particular, the preparation, attendance, and 
follow-up of meetings of technical experts or ministers.  At times, integration efforts are 
duplicated and counterproductive competition between countries and regional institutions – 
including with respect to dispute resolution – can emerge (UNECA, 2004).  In addition, 
budgetary contributions from member states towards the administration costs of the various RTAs 
can be a significant burden, as indicated by the arrears in membership contributions of CEMAC 
members (Performances Management Consulting, 2006). 
Potentially conflicting integration schemes as a result of simultaneous participation in 
several regional trade agreements are another major drawback.  Such contradictory requirements 
indeed have the potential to create serious dilemmas for trade policy makers in CAR and its 
CEMAC and CEEAC partners.  In particular, with CEMAC already a customs union, CEEAC, 
COMESA, and SADC are also hoping to form free trade areas and subsequently customs union in 
the medium-term future.  Since one country can not realistically apply two different common 
external tariffs, let alone implement the customs and fiscal integration (e.g. revenue-sharing) that 
are basic components of fully functioning customs unions, CAR and its RTA partners are sooner 
or later bound to face the choice about which agreement they want to go with. 
One issue that deserves particular attention in the context of overlapping agreements is 
the potentially significant trade transactions costs that can result from the need to comply with 
multiple rules of origin (ROO) regulations (Brenton and Imagawa, 2004).  Preferential trading 
agreements use ROOs to ensure that third countries do not unduly benefit from the preferential 
treatment that members of a RTA grant to one another.  They specify the amount of processing 
that a product must undergo in partner countries in order to quality for market access under the 
preferential agreement.  These rules can add considerable complexity to the trading process and 
augment the costs of international trade, in particular if the ROOs vary across different 
agreements.   
Moreover, companies not only have to comply with the rules on sufficient domestic 
processing, but also need to obtain a certificate from the competent authorities that proves 
compliance.  Within North America, the costs of providing appropriate documentation to prove 
origin have been estimated to amount to as much as 3 per cent of import value (Anson et al., 
2005).  These costs might well be even higher for small-scale firms in developing countries that 
do not have sophisticated accounting procedures in place in order to keep track of the 
geographical origin of their production inputs.  If such firms are then confronted with ROOs that 
vary across different agreements, the effort of showing compliance can become prohibitively 
expensive. 
Strict and complex ROO might also inhibit firms to integrate into global or regional 
production networks.  Indeed, it has been argued that ROO can be trade diverting and can 
“export” protection from one trading partner, who imposes strict ROO, to another, who adjusts 
local production patterns accordingly (Krueger, 1997).  In particular, producers faced with 
restrictive ROOs and the prospect of benefiting from preferential tariffs might well turn away 
from low-cost, third country suppliers of intermediate inputs and towards highly protected, high-
cost suppliers located in the partner country, thereby increasing their production costs and making 
them less competitive in the global market (Krishna and Krueger, 1995). 
Multiple origin schemes also place a burden on the administrative capacity of the 
customs services.  A recent world-wide survey of customs agencies in member countries of the 
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World Customs Organization sought information on the role of customs in issuing and checking 
certificates of origin and requested the views of customs officials on their experiences of 
administering ROOs (Brenton and Imagawa, 2004).  Almost half of all respondents stated that 
overlapping agreements with differing ROO created problems, and of the respondents from 
Africa, more than two-thirds agreed with the statement that overlapping ROO were problematic. 
In addition, there are issues of integrity.  The existence of different rates of import duty 
from different countries provides incentives for false invoicing, so as to show origin in the 
country subject to lower duties.  Also, situations at the border may arise that are open to abuse or 
subject to excessive bureaucracy, thereby inflicting costs on traders in addition and beyond those 
related to compliance with the applicable ROO regulations. 
3.3 Negotiations of an Economic Partnership Agreement 
The conclusion of the intended Economic Partnership Agreement with the European 
Union is likely to have major impacts on the regional configuration in Central Africa and the 
countries in the region.  The EPA negotiations started in 2004 and are supposed to conclude by 
the end of 2007.  The prospective EPA agreement will not improve the preference margins that 
countries like CAR currently enjoy in the EU market.  As a least developed country, CAR is 
eligible for duty and quota free access to the EU market under the EBA initiative, which is of 
unlimited duration.  However, the EBA rules of origin are more restrictive than those under the 
Cotonou Agreement, notably by not allowing “full” regional cumulation and a lower tolerance 
threshold for third country content.  The Government, therefore, has all the interest in maintaining 
the existing benefits and might aim in the EPA negotiations to obtain rules of origin provisions 
that are at least as favorable as those currently enjoyed under Cotonou.  And if it were possible to 
negotiate more favorable specifications that confer origin based, for example, on a simple change 
of tariff heading or a low value-added rule, additional market access opportunities for CAR‟s 
exporters might open up. 
On the imports side, reciprocity means that over a twelve year transition period from 
2008 to 2020, CAR would have to open its market to supplies from EU members.  This market 
opening will have the typical effects of preferential trade liberalization, bringing benefits from 
trade creation, increased competition and lower consumer prices at the expense of costs related to 
trade diversion and loss of tariff revenue.  Partial equilibrium analysis of a prospective EPA in 
Central Africa finds that imports from the EU would increase by 8-23 per cent and that trade 
creation would exceed trade diversion for all CEMAC members (UNECA, 2005).  The trade 
effects would be most pronounced for CAR (Figure 8).  Moreover, the study estimates that a 
quarter of the trade diversion in CAR would come at the expense of other CEMAC members, 
while in the other countries trade diversion would almost exclusively be due to third country 
imports being replaced by imports from the EU.  
Concerning the impact on government revenues, CAR‟s fiscal revenues on imports from 
EU members accounted for 36 per cent of total revenues collected on imports whose origin was 
specified in 2005 (Figure 9).  In addition, a share of the imports of unspecified origin, which 
equally accounted for about 36 per cent of the total, might have also come from EU members.  
Yet, the available information on fiscal revenues raised at the border includes receipts from 
customs surcharges and indirect taxes, such as excises and VAT, in addition to import duties.  
Only the latter, which across all imports accounted for a third of 2005-revenues, would be lost as 
a result of an EPA.   
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Figure 8: Estimated increase in EU imports as a result of an EPA Agreement 
(per cent of total imports in 2005) 
 
Source:  UNECA (2005). 
 
Figure 9: Import tax revenue according to origin of imports, 2005 
 
Note:  Information based on transactions processed through ASYCUDA, so that trade through 
non-computerized border stations is not covered.  Tax receipts on imports of non-identified origin, 
which account for 36 per cent of the total, not included. 
Source:  World Bank staff based on information from National Authorities. 
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The current share of duties on EU imports represents the lower boundary of the 
prospective border tax losses following the full implementation of a prospective EPA.  Actual 
duty losses will be higher, as the preferential market access granted to the EU will tend to lead to 
a replacement of imports from other countries by duty-free EU supplies.  Revenue losses will be 
attenuated to the extent that certain “sensitive” products were to be exempted from the 
liberalization process. 
The coverage of the EPA negotiations is a priori not limited to the goods sector, but 
might also embrace services.  This part of the negotiations could provide opportunities for the 
Government to request EU support for transport and trade facilitation measures that would help 
reduce CAR‟s disadvantages as a landlocked country.  The Government might also use the EPA 
negotiations to lock in and advance reforms of its domestic services sector.  Policies that govern 
international trade in services are typically domestic regulations, some of which serve important 
policy objectives (for example prudential regulations in the banking sector), so that it is crucial to 
design and implement regulations properly.  Technical assistance could be sought for identifying 
reform needs in particular services sectors that would bring the regulatory framework into line 
with international best practice.   
 
4. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR POLICY REFORM AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE 
The following Table develops and presents a set of policy reform priorities and technical 
assistance needs that emerges from the preceding discussion. 
 
  
 19 
Table:  Policy Reform and Technical Assistance Matrix 
Policy issue Action recommended 
Requirements 
Agency involved Time frame 
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Domestic trade policy       
 Reduce reliance on tariff revenue by reducing 
“leakage” and strengthening the tax system. 
X X  
GOCAR, MCIPME, 
MFB 
Longer term 
 Reduce tariff escalation by pushing for a 
reduction in the top rate within CEMAC. 
 X  MCIPME Longer term 
 Review effectiveness of sugar policy with a 
view to liberalize imports. 
 X  
GOCAR, MCIPME, 
MFB, MDR 
Short-Medium 
term 
Regional integration       
 Use EPA negotiations to obtain more 
favorable rules of origin for access to the EU 
market 
 X  MCIPME  Medium term 
 Push for simple, non-restrictive rules of origin 
specifications in regional agreements. 
 X  MCIPME Longer term 
 Aim for flexibility within RTAs in order to 
avoid contradictory requirements. 
 X  
GOCAR, 
MCIPME, MFB 
Longer term 
 Pursue deeper regional integration through 
harmonization of trade standards and behind-
the-border regulations. 
 X  MCIPME Longer term 
 Seek technical assistance for services sector 
reform to adapt regulations to best practice. 
  X MCIPME Longer term 
Note:  Agency abbreviations:  GOCAR = Government of CAR; MCIPME = Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and 
Small and Medium Enterprises, MFB = Ministry of Finance and Budget, MDR = Ministry of Rural Development. 
Time frame:  Short term – within 12 months  Medium term – within 2 years  Longer term – 2 to 5 years. 
Source:  World Bank Staff. 
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